A theory for disturbance decoupling problems has been well developed in the area of geometric control theory. The aim of the present study is to introduce disturbance decoupling problems in a dynamic game context. For this purpose, techniques from geometric control theory are applied. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the solvability of the disturbance decoupling problems introduced here. Consequently, for a given game, the players can easily check if these problems are solvable or not.
Introduction
Dynamic game theory is concerned with situations in which several agents (or "players") who have different objectives are influencing the same dynamic system. Often, the objectives are expressed through cost functions which the agents aim to minimize. The usual notion of optimum in the single-agent case is substituted in the multiple-agent situation by a notion of equilibrium. Actually several such notions exist, depending on the information that the players have about each other's decisions and about the system state; for instance, there is an essential difference between open-loop and closed-loop equilibria. See [1] for an extensive account.
In the single-player case, methods of control design are not always linked to cost functions. Common design objectives such as stability or decoupling in fact do not give rise to unique optimal controls. Design objectives of this type do not seem to have received much attention so far in the context of dynamic games. In this paper, we shall consider a dynamic game version of the well known disturbance decoupling problem [3, 5] . With the idea of closed-loop equilibria in mind, we shall consider the situation in which all players use feedback policies. Even given this, there are several solution concepts to consider depending on whether the players do or do not cooperate and depending on the information that the players have about each other's policies. Specifically, we shall discuss three cases: (i) the cooperative case; (ii) the noncooperative case without information about other players' policies; (iii) the noncooperative with information about other players' policies. In each case, we shall give easily verifiable necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution to exist.
Preliminaries
The system under consideration is assumed to be linear and to be described by the differential equation
where A 2 IR n n , B i 2 IR n m i and E 2 IR n m with the standing assumption that E 6 = 0. The system is controlled by N players; player i influences the system through his control function u i . In addition, the system is influenced by the unknown disturbance function d. The output of player i is given by a linear function z i of the state, i.e. z i = H i x, with H i 2 IR p i n . In this paper only linear state feedback problems are considered, i.e. the players are able to observe the state and they choose controls of the form u i = F i x, with F i 2 IR m i n . With a choice of N feedback maps F i , the output of player i can be written as
where T i (t) := H i e ? A+ P N i=1 B i F i t E is the closed-loop impulse response from disturbance to the output of player i. The system is said to be disturbance decoupled for player i if T i (t) = 0 for all t 0. Let B and H be subspaces of IR n . The maximal (A; B)-controlled invariant contained in H is denoted by max V(A; B; H). The following result is well known. 
where the value of k n is determined by the condition Z k = Z k?1 .
We finally present the hyper-robust disturbance localization problem (section 6.5.1
of [3] ). Consider the case N = 1 and let A, B 1 depend on the parameter q. Then, the hyper-robust disturbance localization problem is to find a feedback map F 1 (q) such that the system is disturbance decoupled (for player 1) for all q 2 Q. For this problem the following result was established [3, Thm. 6.5-1].
Theorem 2.3 The hyper-robust disturbance localization problem is solvable iff
im E max V R (A(q); imB 1 (q); kerH 1 ):
Cooperative Disturbance Decoupling
If the players cooperate it is of common interest to decouple outputs from the disturbance. In the following definition we define the problem of decoupling all the outputs from the disturbance using all the inputs. The standard results from geometric control theory can be applied to this system. If we apply theorem 2.1 we get the following result. 
Noncooperative Disturbance Decoupling
We now turn to the noncooperative setting. Different problems can be posed depending on whether or not players choose their feedback policies in a certain order and are aware of each other's decisions. In this section we shall fix one player (denoted by subscript d) and consider the situations in which this player is or is not aware of the other players' chosen feedback policies. For ease of notation we take N = 2; the second player will be denoted by subscript o.
Strong Noncooperative Disturbance Decoupling
Here we consider the situation without information about other players' choices of feedback policies. The corresponding problem can be formally defined as follows. 
Obviously, this condition (which is stated completely in terms of the system matrices) is a necessary condition for solvability of the SNDDP by state feedback. In the following lemma we prove another consequence of (1). Again we find a necessary condition for the solvability of the SNDDP by state feedback completely in terms of the system matrices. In the following theorem it is stated that (2) and (3) are also sufficient. Together with (4) shows that the closed loop system is disturbance decoupled for player d.
Formula (4) provides a compact necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a feedback control for the decoupling player that achieves disturbance decoupling for him whatever the other player will do. In fact, if condition (4) holds, the corresponding feedback control of the decoupling player achieves disturbance decoupling for any control of the other player.
Weak Noncooperative Disturbance Decoupling
In this subsection we consider the case in which information about other players' feedback policies is available. The corresponding problem can be formally defined as follows.
Definition 4.4 The Weak Noncooperative Disturbance Decoupling Problem (WNDDP) by
state feedback is to find for any given feedback map F o a feedback map F d such that the system is disturbance decoupled for player d.
If the WNDDP by state feedback is solvable, the decoupling player is able to respond to any control of the other player in such a way that he can decouple his output from the disturbance. In particular, if the other player chooses F o = 0, the decoupling player can decouple iff
Hence condition (2) is also a necessary condition for the solvability of the WNDDP by state feedback.
For a given F o the system equations are
Although F o is not manipulable for the decoupling player, it is accessible for his decoupling purposes. We recognize this problem as a particular case of the hyper-robust disturbance localization problem (see the end of section 2 
We have now shown that solvability of the WNDDP by state feedback implies (5) and (7). The latter condition is however not yet in terms of the system matrices. We will remedy this after the following lemma. Formula (8) and (9) provide compact necessary and sufficient conditions for the decoupling player to respond to the action of the other player always in such a way that his output is decoupled from the disturbance.
Concluding Remarks
The aim of the paper was to define some disturbance decoupling problems in the area of differential games. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the solvability of these problems in terms of the system data were derived; consequently, one can easily verify whether the considered problems are solvable for a given system.
The idea of considering games in which the players follow certain control objectives that are not necessarily given by cost functions can be carried further in many ways. In the context of decoupling, extensions can for instance be made in the direction of incorporating stability and to the case where the players are not able to completely observe the state and/or each other's actions. The notion of equilibrium could be incorporated to a greater extent by considering games in which the players know that the other players will look for a decoupling feedback but are not informed about each other's decisions. The two noncooperative problems considered in this paper provide necessary and sufficient conditions respectively for a decoupling solution to exist in this situation.
